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Abs t ract
The  paper  surveys  t he  ‘ ol d’  and  ‘ new ’  pol i t i cal  m acroeconom i cs.  I n  t he  f orme r
w e consi der how  governm ent s can be seen to m ani pul ate the econom y as t o
sati sfy opport uni sti c or ideol ogi cal mo t i ves,  thereby creati ng opport uni sti c or
part i san pol i t i cal busi ness cycles. W e exam ine how  t he m acroeconom i c
r evol ut i on of  t he 1970s cast  doubt s on t he abil i t y of  governm ent s t o f r eely and
r epeatedly  create such cycles.  Consequent l y,   t he  new   pol i t i cal  m acroeconom i cs
have focused m ore on t he eff ect of pol i t i call y i nduced i ncenti ves on t he
i nherent  am ount   of  i nfl ati on i n t he econom i c system .  I n expl ori ng t he concept
of  i nfl ati on  bi as we   att em pt  t o  use  i deas f r om   t he  ol d  pol i t i cal  m acroeconom i cs
t o show  how  t he t wo  s t r ands of li t erature m ay com plem ent one anot her.  The
paper f i ni shes by focusi ng on t he debat e w it hi n t he new  pol i t i cal
m acroeconom i cs about  the possi bl e tr ade-off  bet w een reduced infl ati on bi as
and ext r a out put  vol ati l i t y fol l ow i ng t he est abli shm ent of an independent
centr al  bank.
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1.   Introduct i on
Thi s paper r eview s elem ents of t he ‘ol d’ and ‘new ’ pol i t i cal
m acroeconom i cs.  At   t he  core of  t he  ‘ ol d’  pol i t i cal  m acroeconom i cs i s i dea t hat
governm ent s can shape t he econom y t o sati sfy t hei r   ow n wa n t s.  G overnm ent s
are self - seeking i nst i t ut i ons,  l i ke any ot her.  The nat ure of such econom i c
expedi ency is dependent  upon t he m odel l i ng of governm ent ’ s obj ecti ve
f unct i on.  I n t he W i l l i am  N ordhaus (1975) m odel  a vot e-ma x i mi sing
governm ent  creates a boom -bust  cycle coinci di ng w i t h t he el ectoral cycle. In
t he part i san m odel  of D ougl as H ibbs (1977) the i deol ogi cal persuasion of the
governm ent   i s all   i m port ant.   G overnm ent s are characteri sed as pl acing  di f f erent
r elati ve  we i ght s on  i nfl ati on  and  unem pl oym ent   wh i ch accordi ngl y  aff ect  actual
r ates of unem pl oym ent  and i nfl ati on.  Fi nal l y,  Br uno Frey and Fri edri ch
Schnei der ( 1978) i ncorporate bot h t hese opport uni sti c and ideol ogi cal
elem ents,  all ow i ng  t hei r   t o  be  behavi oural  sw it ches i n  pol i cy.
I n  cont r ast,   t he  new   pol i t i cal  m acroeconom i cs,  wh i ch grew  out   of  t he  new
classical m acroeconom i c revol ut i on of t he 1970s,  r ejects the not i on t hat
governm ent  can fr eely m ani pul ate the econom y.  By appl yi ng pol i t i cal
i ncenti ves t o a new  cl assical m acroeconom i c m odel ,  t he new  pol i t i cal
m acroeconom i cs has f ocused pri ma r i l y  on  i nfl ati on.   I n  part i cular,   argum ent s i n
f avour of rul es-based pol i cies and the depol i t i cising of econom i c pol i cy have
been advocated so as t o  r educe t he  i nherent  am ount   of  i nfl ati on  i n  t he  econom i c
system . Fi nn K ydl and and Edw ard Prescott  (1977) descri be how  di screti on i n3
econom i c pol i cy-ma k i ng l eads to an unnecessary am ount  of infl ati on w i t hout
any  gai ns  f r om   l ow er  unem pl oym ent   or  hi gher  out put .   Robert   Ba r r o and Da v i d
Go r don ( 1983)  consi der  how  governm ent ’ s concern over  t he l oss i n credibi l i t y
f ol l ow i ng  econom i c ma n i pul ati ons  coul d  r educe i nfl ati on  bi as.  We   wi l l   analyse
how  el em ents of t he obj ecti ve funct i ons fr om  t he ‘ol d’ pol i t i cal
m acroeconom i cs coul d  also be  show n  t o  aff ect  i nfl ati on  bi as.  Thi s i s t r ue  of  t he
Al bert oAl esina (1987) m odel  wh i ch show s t hat  Hi bbsi an type pol i cy-ma k e r s
aff ect  t he degree of  i nfl ati on bi as.  Al esina’s i nfl uent i al  m odel   also bri dges t he
gap bet w een the ‘ol d’ and t he ‘new ’ by analysi ng how  a pol i t i cal busi ness
cycle can me r ge  f r om   a new   classical  m acroeconom i c m odel .
The debat e about  the relati ve m eri t s of an independent  centr al bank has
been a ma j or  i ssue f or  new  pol i t i cal  m acroeconom i sts.  Wh i l e t he K ydl and and
Pr escott  (1977) fr am ew ork suggest s that  an independent  centr al bank reduces
or  eli mi nat es i nfl ati on bi as,  K ennet h Rogoff   ( 1985)  argues t hat   t hi s ma y   com e
at the pri ce of greater out put  vari abil i t y.  W e cont r ast Rogoff ’ s m odel  wi t h i t s
adaptati on by A l bert o A l esina and Robert a G att i  w ho again i ncorporate
Hi bbsi an type pol i cy-ma k e r s. They argue t hat  t here is no cl ear associati on
bet w een an i ndependent   centr al  bank  and  greater  out put   vari abil i t y,   off eri ng  t he
possibi l i t y t hat   t he establi shm ent  of  an i ndependent   centr al  bank l eads t o ‘ gai n
wi t hout   pai n’.
I n secti on 2 we   present  an overvi ew  of  t he ol d pol i t i cal  m acroeconom i cs,
before in secti on 3 out l i ni ng t he t hree fundam ent als of new  cl assical4
m acroeconom i cs.  Secti on 4 analyses t he new  pol i t i cal  m acroeconom i cs,  wh i l e
secti on  5  concl udes.
2.   The   Ol d  Pol i t i cal  M acroeconom ics
At   t he  core of  wh a t   we   wi l l   r efer  t o  as t he  ‘ ol d  pol i t i cal  m acroeconom i cs’
i s the possi bi l i t y t hat  governm ent s m ay del i berately shape the econom y for
t hei r   ow n  pol i t i cal  ends.   The  r esurgence  i n  i nt erest  em anated f r om   an art i cle by
Wi l l i am N ordhaus (1975) w ho,  as w e shall  see, descri bed how  a vot e-
ma x i mi sing  governm ent   w oul d  att em pt  t o  court   popul ari t y  by  presidi ng  over  an
expandi ng econom y pri or  t o t he electi on.   Wh a t   ma k e s   t hi s an ‘ ol d’  as opposed
t o a ‘ new ’  pol i t i cal  m acroeconom i c m odel   i s t he assum pti on t hat   governm ent s
can repeatedly m ani pul ate the econom y.  In t he N ordhaus m odel  it  is assum ed
bot h t hat  quant i t i es m ove m ore qui ckly t han pri ces and that  vot ers ignore or
di scount  hi gher fut ure infl ati on.  Thi s is in cont r ast wi t h t he assum pti ons of
ma r ket  cleari ng,  r ati onal  expectati ons and a nat ural r ate aggregate suppl y
f unct i on w hi ch are centr al to t he new  cl assical m acroeconom i c revol ut i on of
t he  1970s.
The Nor dhaus m odel  i s an opport uni sti c, vot e-ma x i mi sing m odel .
Ho we v e r ,  the ol d pol i t i cal m acroeconom i cs also encom passes part i san theory.
Hi bbs ( 1977)  argues t hat   pol i t i cal  part i es aim  t o sati sfy not   a me d i an vot er  but
t hei r  ow n core consti t uent  or representati ve vot er.  We  s h a l l  di scuss how  t hi s
r elates t o  di f f erent  we i ght s bei ng  pl aced on  t he  r elati ve  econom i c i m port ance of5
i nfl ati on and unem pl oym ent .  Fi nal l y,  i n t hi s secti on w e consi der t he Frey-
Schnei der  m odel   ( 1977)  wh i ch i ncorporates elem ents of  bot h  t he  No r dhaus  and
Hi bbs approaches. Econom i c pol i cy can be descri bed as opport uni sti c or
i deol ogi cal  dependi ng  on  t he  governm ent ’ s perceived  electoral  securi t y.
2. 1  The  Nordhaus  M odel
The ‘ pure’ pol i t i cal busi ness cycle m odel  is associated w it h t he w ork of
No r dhaus ( 1975).   The  t erm  ‘ pure’  i s a consequence of  No r dhaus’s assum pti on
t hat  pol i t i cal part i es are int erested not  in sat i sfyi ng i deol ogi cal goal s but  in
ma x i mi sing vot es at an electi on.  The electi on peri od i s taken to be of fi xed
l engt h so t hat  there are peri odi c electi ons.  The econom y i s descri bed by t he
Phi l l i ps  curve  r elati onshi p  bet w een i nfl ati on  and  unem pl oym ent ,   such t hat   t here
exists a greater  t r ade-off   i n  t he  l ong-r un  t han  i n  t he  short - r un.
Vo t ers are assum ed t o have a poor  understandi ng of  t he econom i c system
and use rates of i nfl ati on and unem pl oym ent  t o j udge t he governm ent ' s
perf orm ance. Vo t ers'  me mo r i es extend onl y over t he course of t he curr ent
electi on peri od and furt hermo r e they pl ace increasingl y l ess w eight  on past
events. The aggregate vot e funct i on i s th e  s u mma t i on of i ndi vi dual  vot i ng
f unct i ons.  The f i nal  assum pti on of t he N ordhaus m odel  i s that  t he score
hypot hesi s hol ds so t hat  popul ari t y i s dir ectl y related to econom i c out com es.
Specif i call y,  t hi s m odel  associates ri sing unem pl oym ent  and i nfl ati on w i t h
f all i ng  popul ari t y.6
Gi ven t hese assum pti ons governm ent  i s able to expl oi t  t he short - r un
Phi l l i ps  curve  i n  order  t o  ma x i mi se vot es at  electi on  t i me .   I f   t here wa s   no  short -
r un t r ade-off  the governm ent  w oul d pursue the soci all y opt i ma l  infl ati on rate
consi stent wi t h t he t angency bet w een the l ong-r un Phi l l i ps curve and t he
aggregate vot i ng funct i on.  Wi t h t he short - r un Phi l l i ps curve governm ent  vot e-
ma x i mi sing behavi our imp l i es a poli t i cal busi ness cycle. Pr i or to an electi on
governm ent  att em pts to i ncrease aggregate vot es by m ovi ng al ong one
part i cular short - r un Phi l l i ps curve,  t r ading-off  i nfl ati on for l ow er
unem pl oym ent .   Pr ovi ded  i nfl ati on  i s not   t oo  hi gh  governm ent s can att ain  hi gher
l evels of  popul ari t y  and  so i mp r ove  t hei r   chances of  bei ng  r e-elected.
The  pol i t i call y expedi ent  pol i cy out com es cannot   be sustained since t hey
do not  li e along t he l ong-r un Phi l l i ps curve or infl ati on-unem pl oym ent  tr ade-
off .   Ther efore,  aft er  an electi on  t he  governm ent   has  an i ncenti ve  t o  cont r act  t he
econom y i n order to reduce infl ati on.  The l ow er infl ati on w hen governm ent
i ni t i ates a pre-electi on expansi on,  the hi gher the at t ainabl e level of popul ari t y
and  t he  greater  t he  chance of  electi on  success.  I f   i nfl ati on  i s hi gh  enough  wh e n
t he pre-electi on expansi on i s ini t i ated, governm ent  can actual l y reduce
i ndi vi dual s’ we l f are and it s ow n popul ari t y.  In short ,  t he governm ent  wi l l
i nduce  f all i ng  unem pl oym ent   and  r i sing  out put   grow t h  pri or  t o  t he  electi on  and
r i sing  unem pl oym ent   and  f all i ng  out put   grow t h  aft er  t he  electi on.
2. 2  Par t i san t heory7
The pure pol i t i cal busi ness cycle approach om it t ed an ideol ogi cal
di me n s i on fr om  t he ut i l i t y funct i on of pol i t i cians. Pol i t i cal part i es are a
coali t i on of int erests. A ssum ing t hat  the onl y m ot i vat i on i s to retain pow er
i gnores issues relati ng t o t he pursuance of part i san int erests. Par t i san theory
categori ses pol i t i cal  part i es as bei ng  of  t he  Lef t   or  Ri ght .   I t   port r ays t he  part y  of
t he  Lef t   as bei ng  concerned  wi t h  t he  i nt erests of  t he  wo r ker  and  t he  part y  of  t he
Ri ght  as defendi ng t he i nt erests of the ent r epreneur.  In order to defend t hese
i nt erests part i san theory assum es that  a part y of t he Left  wi l l  pri ori t i se
unem pl oym ent  over i nfl ati on and undert ake m onetary and fi scal pol i cies to
prom ot e grow t h and w el f are. The par t y of the Ri ght  wi l l  pri ori t i se infl ati on
over unem pl oym ent .  M onet ary and fi scal pol i cy w il l  be t i ght er than under a
part y  of  t he  Lef t .
The def i ni t i on of part i san theory st r esses that  pol i t i cal part i es w il l  have
di f f erent econom i c pri ori t i es. A n econom i c vali dat i on of t he concept  of
part i sanshi p consi ders how  i ndi vi dual s are aff ected di f f erentl y over  t he course
of the busi ness cycle. If  it  is possibl e to i dent i f y groups such t hat  they are
aff ected di f f erentl y over  t he course of  t he busi ness cycle,  t hen i t   w oul d appear
val i d t o have pol i t i cal part i es that  off ered dif f erent econom i c pri ori t i es. The
pol i t i cal  part i es w oul d  t hen  be  able t o  use  pol i cy i n  order  t o  serve  t he  econom i c
i nt erests of  t hei r   core const i t uent s.
Par t i san theory can be categori sed accordi ng t o w het her or not
governm ent s persistentl y  pursues part i san pol i cies.  St r ong  part i san t heory  t akes
t he pursuit  of part i san econom i c pol i cies as the sol e obj ecti ve of pol i t i cal8
behavi our wi t h t hese pol i cies havi ng persistent eff ects on t he econom y.  The
abil i t y t o m ani pul ate the econom y for part i san obj ecti ves result s in st r ong
part i san t heory  also bei ng  r eferr ed t o  as t he  part y  cont r ol   hypot hesi s.
St r ong part i san theory i s closel y associated w it h D ougl as H ibbs (1977).
Tes t s f or  t he  eff ect  of  str ong  part i san t heory  t hus  i nvol ve  analysi ng  wh e t her  t he
Lef t   versus Ri ght   di me n s i on  has  l ed t o  di scerni bl e part i san eff ects on  econom i c
i nst r um ent s and  out com es,  net   of  t r ends,   cycles and  r andom   f l uct uat i ons.
2. 3  The  F rey and  Schnei der  m odel
The Fr ey and Schnei der (1978) approach is the cl assic exposi t i on of w eak
part i san theory si nce part i san econom i c pol i cies are not  alw ays pursued. It
hi ghl i ght s a tr ade-off  bet w een opport uni sm  and i deol ogy and,  t herefore,
cont r asts w it h t he pol ari sed perspecti ves of the pure pol i t i cal busi ness cycle
and st r ong part i san m odel s. The m echanism  that  underpi ns t he m odel  i s
governm ent ' s popul ari t yl ead over  t he  ma i n  opposi t i on  part y.   Thi s all ow s  pol i cy
behavi our t o sw i t ch fr om  bei ng opport uni sti call y m ot i vat ed to i deol ogi call y
mo t i vat ed. G overnm ent  i s assum ed to feel electorall y safe w hen it s actual
popul ari t y l ead is in excess of wh a t  is perceived t o be necessary t o be re-
elected. Thi s is referr ed to as t he cri t i cal popul ari t y l ead and is dependent  on
t he t i me  t o t he next  electi on.  The nearer the fort hcom i ng el ecti on,  the hi gher
t he  desi r ed cri t i cal  popul ari t y  l ead.9
I f   governm ent ' s actual   popul ari t y  l ead i s i n  excess of  t he  cri t i cal  popul ari t y
l ead then governm ent  hol ds a popul ari t y surpl us.  If  governm ent ' s popul ari t y
l ead f all s short   of  t he  cri t i cal  l ead t hen  governm ent   hol ds  a popul ari t y  defi cit .   A
popul ari t y  surpl us  mo t i vat es governm ent   t o  act  i deol ogi call y  wh i l e a popul ari t y
defi cit   mo t i vat es t hem   t o  act  opport uni sti call y.
O pport uni sti c behavi our duri ng a popul ari t y defi cit  conforms  t o t he pre-
electi on behavi our descri bed by N ordhaus.  The s cor e hypot hesi s is again
assum ed so that  to i ncrease popul ari t y governm ent  ma n i pul ates the l evers of
governm ent  pol i cy to aff ect econom i c vari ables, such as unem ploym ent  and
i nfl ati on. Ideol ogi cal behavi our i s defi ned by t he desi r ed proport i on of
governm ent   expendi t ures i n  GDP.   A  l eft - wi ng  governm ent   wi l l   aim  f or  a hi gher
r elati ve si ze of governm ent  expendi t ure than a ri ght - wi ng governm ent .  Thi s
sati sfi es the part i san characteri sti cs of a left - wi ng part y i n prom ot i ng w el f are
and  econom i c grow t h.
3.   Ne w  Cl assical  M acroeconom ics
The new  classical r evol ut i on of t he 1970s w as based on t hree
f undam ent als.  The  f i r st  wa s   t hat   of  cont i nuous  ma r ket   cleari ng.   Thi s i nfers t hat
t he econom y i s in a cont i nuous st ate of equi l i bri um .  Thi s is in cont r ast to
K eynesi an m odel s w hich all ow  for the fail ure of ma r ket s to cl ear.  Indeed, a
centr al task for Ne w Ke y n e s i ans has been to expl ain w hy i t  is rati onal  for
possibl e gai ns  f r om   t r ade not   expl oi t ed t o  exist  f or  any  peri od  of  t i me .10
The second fundam ent al wa s  t he rati onal  expectati ons hypot hesi s,
wh e r eby econom i c agents t ake i nt o account   wh a t   t hey bel i eve t o be t he corr ect
econom i c m odel  and m ake use of all  avail able informa t i on.  Ag e n t s can m ake
err ors in t hei r  f orecasts since avail able informa t i on m ay be i ncom pl ete.
Ho we v e r ,   t hese err ors are not   r elated t o t he i nforma t i on set  t he i ndi vi dual   had
at  t he t i me   of  t he expectati on.   I f   i ndi vi dual s ma d e   system ati c err ors t hey coul d
l earn  f r om   t hei r   mi stakes and  change t he  wa y   expectati ons  are f orme d .
The t hi r d fundam ent al wa s  t he aggregate suppl y hypot hesi s, perhaps
bet t er know n as t he Lucas surpri se suppl y funct i on.  Lucas (1973) argues t hat
i ndi vi dual  suppl i ers of goods and servi ces, incl udi ng l abour,  wi l l  alt er thei r
suppl y deci sion onl y i f  they bel i eve that  the real pri ce of thei r  product  has
changed.  Thei r  probl em  is then at t em pti ng t o di scern,  gi ven t hei r  informa t i on
set,  wh e t her or not  thei r  real product  pri ce has changed.  Thi s is know n as a
signal   extr acti on  probl em .  Wh i l e t hey  know   t hei r   product   pri ce t hey  mu s t   ma k e
expectati ons  about   t he  overall   pri ce l evel  of  t he  econom y.
The t hree fundam ent als of new  cl assical econom i cs led to t he pol i cy
i nvari ance r esult   ( see Sar gent   and  Wa l l ace,  1975)  i n  wh i ch anti cipat ed dem and
m anagem ent  pol i cies have no aff ect on out put  or unem pl oym ent  l evels.
Ra t i onal  agents w oul d t ake governm ent  pol i cies int o account  t hereby ful l y
anti cipat i ng t he eff ects on t he general pri ce level and l eaving out put  and
unem pl oym ent   unchanged  at  t hei r   nat ural  l evels.  On l y  unant i cipat ed pol i cy wi l l
i nfl uence  em ploym ent   and  out put   l evels.11
On  t he basi s of t he pol i cy invari ance result  new  cl assical econom i sts
began t o devel op m odel s that  show ed clear draw backs fr om  governm ent s
att em pti ng  t o  r educe unem pl oym ent   ( i ncrease out put )   bel ow   ( above)  i t s   nat ural
l evel.   An   i m port ant  start i ng poi nt   i n t hi s devel opm ent   and of  t he new  pol i t i cal
m acroeconom i cs w as the w ork of K ydl and and Prescott  (1977) w ho show ed
how  a governm ent ,  wh i l e disli ki ng i nfl ati on,  w oul d be t em pted to generate
unexpect ed or surpri se infl ati on i n order to reduce unem pl oym ent  bel ow  i t s
nat ural  l evel.   Ho we v e r ,   t he publ i cs’  r ecogni t i on of  t hi s i ncenti ve l eads t hem  t o
r evise t hei r   i nfl ati onary expectati ons upw ards t o a poi nt   wh e r e t he governm ent
w oul d no l onger be w i l l i ng t o generate surpri se infl ati on.  The r esult  i s
excessive  i nfl ati on.
4.   The   Ne w  Pol i t i cal  M acroeconom ics
4. 1  Ti me   i nconsi stency
K ydl and and Prescott  ( 1977) we r e the forerunners of an econom i c
analysi s w hich has brought  toget her elem ents of the pol i t i cal busi ness cycle
l i t erature wi t h  mo r e ma i nst r eam  m acroeconom i cs.
K ydl and and Prescott ’ s paper provi des a str ong argum ent  against
di screti onary econom i c pol i cies. Thei r  argum ent  is formu l ated using a N ew
Cl assical m odel  wh e r e the pol i cy-ma k e r  is engaged i n a st r ategic gam e w it h
sophi sti cated f orwa r d-l ooki ng  pri vat e sector  agents.  Thi s wa s   one  att ack on  t he12
t heory of econom i c pol i cy of Ti nbergen (1952).  Ti nbergen argued t hat  t he
pol i cy-ma k e r   coul d  specif y  t he  t arget s or  goal s of  econom i c pol i cy,  such as l ow
i nfl ati on and unem pl oym ent ,  and gi ven t hi s social we l f are funct i on,  a set of
i nst r um ent s w oul d  be  chosen  t o  achieve t hese  t arget s.  These i nst r um ent s w oul d
be set  at val ues det ermi ned by som e m odel  of the econom y.  E ssenti all y,  thi s
approach i s an exercise i n  opt i ma l   cont r ol   t heory.
K ydl and  and  Pr escott   argue  t hat   opt i ma l   cont r ol   t heory  i s i nappropri ate i n
social  system s wh e r e i nt ell i gent   agents wi l l   att em pt  t o  anti cipat e pol i cy acti ons.
Consequent l y,  t he di screti onary pol i cy w hich is best,  gi ven t he curr ent
sit uat i on,   does  not   r esult   i n  t he  social  obj ecti ve  f unct i on  bei ng  ma x i mi sed.
M anki w ( 1990) gi ves an excell ent non-econom i c exam ple of t he
i m port ance of expectati ons i n det ermi ni ng t he opt i ma l i t y of a pol i cy. He
consi ders the quest i on of negot i ati ng w i t h t err ori sts over t he release of
host ages. The announced pol i cy of mo s t  governm ent s is that  they w i l l  never
negot i ate over host ages. If  t here is not hi ng t o be gai ned fr om  ki dnappi ng,
r ati onal   t err ori sts wi l l   not   t ake host ages.  Ho we v e r ,   t err ori sts are r ati onal   enough
t o know  t hat  once host ages are taken, the announced pol i cy m ay have l i t t l e
credibi l i t y  and  t he  t em ptati on  t o  ma k e   som e concessions  t o  obt ain  t he  host ages’
r elease ma y   becom e overwh e l mi ng.   The  onl y wa y   t o det er  r ati onal   t err ori sts i s
t o som e how  t ake aw ay t he di screti on of  pol i cy-ma k e r s and c o mmi t   t hem  t o a
r ul e of  never  negot i ati ng.13
Thi s sam e probl em ,  argue  K ydl and  and  Pr escott ,     ari ses i n t he conduct   of
m onet ary pol i cy. A ssum e the econom y can be m odel l ed by a Lucas Surpri se
Suppl y  f unct i on
UU tt tt
e =− − * () a ΠΠ ( 1)
wh e r e Ut  i s unem pl oym ent   i n peri od t ,  Ut
*  is the nat ural level,   α the Phi l l i ps
curve sl ope param eter and  Πt and  Πt
e are the actual  and expect ed rates of
i nfl ati on  i n  peri od  t .   Thi s i s const r aint   f acing  t he  pol i cy-ma k e r .
K ydl and  and  Pr escott   assum e t hat   t he  governm ent   or  pol i cy-ma k e r   has  an
obj ecti ve funct i on  wh i ch r ati onal i ses t he  pol i cy choi ce and  i s of  t he  f orm
Ss U tt = (,) Π ( 2)
wh e r e the fi r st part i al deri vat i ves of S wi t h respect to each of Πt and Ut are
negat i ve.  A  consi stent pol i cy w il l  seek to m axi mi se (2) subj ect to (1).  The
cont ours of  t hi s social  obj ecti ve  f unct i on  are show n  i n  f i gure 1  and  i ndi cated by
t he  i ndi f f erence curves  S1,S2,S3  and  S4.
Al l   poi nt s on  t he  vert i cal  axis are pot enti al  equi l i bri a since unem pl oym ent
i s at the nat ural level and agents are corr ectl y forecasti ng i nfl ati on,  so that
ΠΠ t
e
t = .   The  i ndi f f erence curves  i ndi cate t hat   t he  opt i ma l   posi t i on  i s at  O  wh e r e
Πt = 0 and UU t t = *.14
Wh i l e the m onet ary aut hori t i es can determi ne t he rate of infl ati on,  the
r elevant Phi l l i ps curve w i l l  depend on t he i nfl ati onary expect ati ons of
econom i c agents. Suppose t he econom y i s ini t i all y at  poi nt  D o n  i ndi f f erence
curve S4.   The  pol i cy-ma k e r   wi shes t o achieve t he hi ghest   possibl e i ndi f f erence
curve know i ng t hat  if  agents adjust  thei r  infl ati onary expect ati ons accurately,
t he econom y w i l l  reach an equil i bri um  al ong t he y-axis. If  the pol i cy-ma k e r
announces t hat  they w i l l  defl ate the econom y i n order to del i ver the opt i ma l
zero  r ate of  i nfl ati on  i n  t he  next   peri od,   how   shoul d  econom i c agents r espond?
Econom i c agents reali se that  i f  t he governm ent  keeps to i t s prom i sed
pol i cy i n t he next   t i me   peri od,   i t   wi l l   have an i ncenti ve i n t he t i me   peri od aft er
t hat  to renege on it s anti - i nfl ati on pol i cy, and expand t he econom y al ong t he
Phi l l i ps curve wi t h i nfl ati onary expectati ons of Πo
e  t o r each poi nt   A.   Ex  post ,
t he  zero  i nfl ati on  pol i cy announcem ent   i s not   opt i ma l   and  i st i me   i nconsi stent.
The  announcem ent   i s not   seen as credibl e by  econom i c agents because t hey  are
aw are of  t he  governm ent ’ s i ncenti ve  t o  abandon  t he  zero-i nfl ati on  pol i cy.  They
wi l l  not  bel i eve it ,  and hence t hey w i l l  not  r educe thei r  i nfl ati onary
expectati ons  t o  zero.
Econom i c agents wi l l   observe  t hat   at  poi nt   C,   wh e r e t he  short - r un  Phi l l i ps
curve w i t h t he associated expectati ons  Πc
e i s at a tangent  t o a governm ent
i ndi f f erence curve on t he vert i cal  axis,  governm ent   has no i ncenti ve t o devi ate
f r om  t he nat ural r ate. The onl y credibl e anti - i nfl ati on pol i cy w hich the
authori t i es ma y   i mp l em ent  i s one wh i ch part i all y r educes i nfl ati on,   t o poi nt   C.15
The di stance fr om  t he opt i ma l  infl ati on rate (O)  to t he di screti onary i nfl ati on
r ate ( C)   i s excessive  i nfl ati on  and  i s know n  as i nfl ati on  bi as.
I n t hi s m onet ary gam e di scussed by K ydl and and Prescott ,  t he
governm ent  is the dom i nant  pl ayer and acts as leader.  Wh e n  t he governm ent
decides on i t s opt i ma l   pol i cy i t   wi l l   t ake i nt o account   t he l i kel y r eacti on of  t he
f ol l ow ers w ho are t he pri vat e agents.  Thi s i s an exam ple of  a non-co-operati ve
St ackelberg gam e.  In a St ackelberg gam e,  unl ess there is a pre-c o mmi t me n t
f r om  t he l eader wi t h respect to t he announced pol i cy, the opt i ma l  pol i cy (O)
wi l l   be dynam i call y i nconsi stent  because t he governm ent   can i mp r ove i t s ow n
pay-off  by cheati ng.  Si nce pri vat e agents know  t hi s, t he t i m e consi stent
equi l i bri um   ( C)   i s a Na s h   equi l i bri um .
The non-co-operati ve N ash equi l i bri um  i ndi cated by poi nt  C i l l ust r ated
how  di screti onary pol i cy m ay produce a sub-opt i ma l  out com e exhibi t i ng an
i nfl ati onary bi as.  Si nce r ati onal   agents can anti cipat e t he str ategy of  m onet ary
authori t i es w ho possess di screti onary pow ers, they w i l l  anti cipat e Πc
e.  H ence,
pol i cy-ma k e r s mu s t   also suppl y i nfl ati on equal   t o Πc
e  i n order  t o prevent  a f all
i n  r eal  out put   and  a r i se i n  unem pl oym ent .
He r b Tayl or (1985) consi der the vari ous out com es that  can ari se in t hi s
sort  of gam e bet w een m onetary aut hori t i es and w age negot i ators. Suppose
f i r m s and w orkers in t he econom y agree on cont r acts specif yi ng l ow  w age
i ncreases.  Gi ven  t he  pol i cy-ma k e r   i s wi l l i ng  t o  pursue a hi gh  i nfl ati on  pol i cy t o
r educe unem pl oym ent ,   wi t h l ow  wa g e   i ncreases alr eady l ocked i n,   t he pol i cy-16
ma k e r  w oul d have i t s chance. If  labour ma r ket  part i cipant s signed cont r acts
specif yi ng hi gh w age i ncreases for t he year,  again t he m onet ary aut hori t y
w oul d be w i l l i ng t o run a hi gh i nfl ati on m onet ary pol i cy in order t o keep
unem pl oym ent   f r om  r i sing above i t s nat ural  l evel  as w oul d happen wi t h a l ow
i nfl ati on  pol i cy.
I n short ,   f i r ms   and wo r kers of  t he econom y enter  i nt o wa g e   negot i ati ons
wi t h t he r eali sati on t hat   pursuing a hi gh m oney grow t h,   hi gh i nfl ati on pol i cy i s
t he onl y t i m e consi stent pl an for the pol i cy-ma k e r  to fol l ow .  They t hus si gn
cont r acts f or  hi gh  wa g e   i ncreases at  t he  begi nni ng  of  t he  year.   Du r i ng  t he  year,
t he pol i cy-ma k e r   pursues t he hi gh m oney grow t h pol i cy t hat   t hey expected,  so
i nfl ati on  com es i n  hi gh.   Un e mp l oym ent   sett l es at  i t s nat ural  l evel.   As   a r esult   of
t he t i me  i nconsi stency of the opt i ma l  low  i nfl ati on pol i cy, the pol i cy-ma k e r
wi nds up creati ng an excessive rate of infl ati on even though i t s gains not hi ng
on  t he  unem pl oym ent   f r ont .
T he possibi l i t y t hat  pol i cy-ma k e r ’ s infl ati on announcem ent s can be ti me
i nconsi stent led B arr o and G ordon (1983) to analyse t he propert i es of ti me
consi stent rates of infl ati on.  They r eferr ed to t hese as enforceable infl ati on
r ates w hich rem oved any t em ptati on for the pol i cy-ma k e r  to at t em pt surpri se
i nfl ati on.
Ag a i n assum e the econom y i s m odel l ed by Lucas Surpri se Suppl y
f unct i on  so t hat   we   can wr i t e out put   ( Y)   as17
YY tt t
e =+ − * () a ΠΠ ( 3)
Let   us norma l i se t he nat ural  l evel  of  expected out put   at  zero and set a   equal
t o  1  so t hat   we   can r e-wr i t e ( 3)  as
Yttt
e =− ΠΠ ( 4)
I t   i s assum ed t hat   t he pol i cy-ma k e r   has a t arget   l evel  of  out put ,  k, above
t he  nat ural  l evel,   t hus,   k>0.  To  achieve t hi s r equi r es t he  i nducem ent  of  surpri se
i nfl ati on.   Thi s i s evident   wh e n   we   wr i t e t he  pol i cy-ma k e r ’ s l oss f unct i on  as
Z
b
kY tt t =+ −
1
22
2 Π () ( 5)
Subst i t ut i ng  f or  Yt  t hi s i s equi val ent  t o
Z
b
k tt t t
e =+ − −
1
22
2 ΠΠ Π () ( 6)
The  f i r st  t erm  i s seen as r epresenti ng t he so-call ed m enu or  shoe-l eather  costs
associated w it h changi ng pri ces. The opt i ma l  rate of infl ati on i s zero i n t hi s
case since any  devi ati on  of  i nfl ati on  f r om   zero  i m poses  a cost.
1  The  param eter,
b,   i s t he benefi t   param eter  of  generati ng surpri se i nfl ati on and t akes a posi t i ve
val ue.
1.   We   coul d  m odi f y  t he  governm ent ’ s l oss f unct i on  so t hat   i t   i s of  t he  f orm
Zb k tt t t
e =−+ − −
1
2
2 () ( ) * ΠΠ ΠΠ
The  opt i ma l   r ate of  i nfl ati on  w oul d  t hen  be Π*r ather  t han  zero.18
I t  i s assum ed that  t he publ i c form s expectati ons rati onal l y before the
pol i cy-ma k e r  or governm ent  chooses t he val ue of Π,  the pol i cy inst r um ent .
Mi ni mi sing t he expected val ue of  t he pol i cy-ma k e r s l oss f unct i on gi ves us t he










The  out put   l evel  of  t he  econom y  i s t hus
Y = 0 ( 9)




bk di s t = =+ +
1
22
2 [( ) ] ( 10)
Ther efore, t he l oss w il l  be greater t he hi gher i s the pol i cy-ma k e r ’ s benefi t
param eter and al so the l arger the t arget  level of out put  relati ve t o t he nat ural
l evel.
2.   Wi t h  an opt i ma l   r ate of  i nfl ati on  of Π*,   t he  di screti onary  choi ce w oul d  be





Ther efore,  t he  di screti onary  choi ce r efl ects bot h  t he  opt i ma l   i nfl ati on  r ate and  t he  benefi t   param eter.
3.   Wh e r e t he  nat ural  l evel  of  out put ,   Y*,   i s non-zero,   t he  l oss t he  pol i cy-ma k e r   w oul d  i ncur  i s
z
b
bk Y di s t = =+ +− −
1
22
2 [ () ( ) ] *19
Equat i ons (7) and (9) confi r m t he K ydl and and Prescott  fi ndi ng of a
posi t i ve  i nfl ati on  bi as r esult i ng  f r om   a l ack of  any  pre-c o mmi t me n t   wi t hout   any
aff ect  on  t he  l evel  of  out put .
4. 2  Enf orceabl e Infl at i on  Rat es
Ba r r o and G ordon proceeded to analyse t he propert i es of t he l ow est
enforceable infl ati on rate. To understand t hese propert i es B arr o and G ordon
i nt r oduce  t he  concepts of  t em ptati on  and  enforcem ent.   The  f orme r   i s a m easure
of  t he  gai ns  a pol i cy-ma k e r   can deri ve  f r om   r eneging  on  a pol i cy announcem ent
and i s consi stent wi t h t he K ydl and and Prescott  analysi s. The concept of
enforcem ent  i s a m easure of  f ut ure r eput ati onal   costs i m posed  by  pri vat e sector
agents associated wi t h  r eneging  i n  t he  curr ent  peri od.   To  understand  bot h  t hese
concepts let us understand w hy a zero i nfl ati on rul e is not  enforceable,
alt hough  we   know   t hat   t hi s i s t he  i deal  r ul e.
A ssum e the governm ent  announces a zero i nfl ati on pol i cy and that  the
publ i c expects zero i nfl ati on.  The governm ent  w oul d face the expect ed cost
f unct i on:
EZ
b
k tt t [] ( ) = =− −− −
1
22
2 ΠΠ ( 11)
I f  i t  t hen proceeded to m i ni mi se (11),  t hi s w oul d yi eld t he di screti onary
i nfl ati on  choi ce, 
b






The  cost  of  t hi s ‘ cheati ng’  i nfl ati on  pol i cy i s
Z
b
bk cheatt = =− −− −
1
22
2 [( ) ] ( 13)
I f   t he pol i cy-ma k e r   had cont i nued wi t h t he pol i cy announcem ent   of  zero
i nfl ati on  t he  costs of  i nfl ati on  w oul d  have  been
4
Zb k rule t = =
1
2 ( 14)
Ther efore,  t here exists a posi t i ve  t em ptati on  t o  r enege on  a zero  i nfl ati on  r ul e.
Tempt ati on  can be  expressed generall y  as:
t em p Z Z tr u l e cheat tt =− ( 15)






2 () ( 16)
At   t hi s poi nt   Ba r r o  and  Go r don  not e t hat   we   have  i gnored any  f ut ure costs
associated w it h t oday’s infl ati on choi ce. By i nt r oduci ng reput ati on i nt o t he
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wh i l e t he  cost  of  cont i nui ng  wi t h  t hi s announcem ent   w oul d  be
Zb k rule t = =+ +
1
2
2 [( ) ] * Π21
equat i on w e can l i mi t  the degree of infl ati on bi as as m easured fr om  t he i deal
r ul e or  opt i ma l   i nfl ati on r ate.  To  do t hi s i t   i s assum ed t hat   i f   t he pol i cy-ma k e r
cheats in peri od t ,  i n peri od t +1 t he publ i c w il l  expect t he di screti onary
i nfl ati on choi ce. Ther efore, the enforcem ent cost is essenti all y hi gher fut ure
i nfl ati onary  expectati ons.
Cur r ent enforcem ent costs are the di scount ed value of t he di f f erence
bet w een t he costs of  havi ng t o f ol l ow  t he di screti onary choi ce next   peri od and
t he  costs of  cont i nui ng  wi t h  t he  r ul e.  Wr i t t en mo r e f orma l l y  t hi s i s
enf q Z Z td i sr u l e tt = =− −
+ ++ + ()
11 ( 17)
wh e r eq   i s t he  di scount   f actor.
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Ther efore, provi ded t hat  there is som e discount i ng of the fut ure, enforcem ent
costs wi l l   not   ensure t hat   t he zero i nfl ati on r ul e i s credibl e.  On l y i f   t here i s no
di scount i ng  of  t he  f ut ure wi l l   zero  i nfl ati on  be  enforceable.
5
5.  Wi t h a posi t i ve opt i ma l  i nfl ati on rate tem ptati on and enforcem ent wi t h t he zero i nfl ati on
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To f i nd t he best  enforceable rul e (t he l ow est  enforceable infl ati on rate)
one needs t o equat e tem ptati on w i t h enforcem ent and sol ve for Π.  D enot i ng
t he best  infl ati on rul e as  Πbest,  we  f i r st calculate tem ptati on,  wh e r e thi s is the
di f f erence in cost  wh e n   Πbest i s expected and del i vered and w hen  Πbest i s
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The  enforcem ent  costs associated wi t h r eneging i n t hi s peri od and f acing
t he di screti onary i nfl ati on choi ce next   peri od,   r ather  t han cont i nual l y pursuing
t he  r ul e are
enf q
b
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Pr ovi ded  0<q<1,   t hen  t he  best   enforceable r ul e i s f ound  t o  be
Ther efore,  t em ptati on  i s greater  t han  wh e n   t he  opt i ma l   i nfl ati on  r ate i s posi t i ve.   Thi s i s because mo r e
surpri se infl ati on i s generated and because the pol i cy-ma k e r ’ s opt i ma l  i nfl ati on rate is posi t i ve.








Thi s i s a we i ght ed average of  t he i deal  r ul e ( t he opt i ma l   i nfl ati on r ate)  and of
di screti on.  A h i gher di scount  f actor ( a low er q) l eads to a hi gher best
enforceable infl ati on rul e. L ess discount i ng of the fut ure reduces the val ue of
t he best  enforceable infl ati on rul e since enforcem ent costs have greater
i m port ance.
The bes t  enforceable infl ati on rul e is simp l y t he l ow est  del i verable and
credibl e infl ati on announcem ent .  Ho we v e r ,  w e can draw  furt her on t he ol d
pol i t i cal m acroeconom i c li t erature to consi der t he eff ect of pol i t i cs on t he
i nherent  am ount   of  i nfl ati on  i n  t he  econom i c system .  I f   one  accepts t he  prem ise
t hat  a governm ent  i s prone t o at t em pt pre-electi on expansi ons as i n t he
No r dhaus m odel   t hen t here are t wo   com plem entary eff ects i nfl uenci ng t he best
enforceable r ul e.  Fi r stl y,   we   ma y   expect  t he  benefi t   param eter,   b,   t o  be  aff ected
by t he posi t i on i n t he el ectoral cycle. In t he N ordhaus m odel  w e have pre-
electi on boom  fol l ow ed by post - electi on sl um p.  Tr anslati ng t hi s to t he Barr o-
Go r don fr am ew ork i nfers that  t he governm ent ’ s benefi t  param eter w oul d
i ncrease over  t he  course of  t he  electoral  cycle.
The  second  com plem entary  eff ect  ari ses f r om   t he  i m pact  of  t he  t i me   t o  an
electi on on t he di scount  rate appli ed to fut ure infl ati on cost s. Thi s too i s  a
centr al  concern  i n  t he  No r dhaus  m odel   since an expansi on  f r om   an i ni t i all y  l ow
i nfl ati on rate, rather than a hi gh rate, has a posi t i ve i m pact on vot es. In t he24
cont ext of the Barr o-Go r don m odel ,  the quest i on i s w hether the gai ns fr om
surpri se infl ati on t oday out we i gh t he fut ure cost of hi gher i nfl ati onary
expectati ons.   Ho we v e r ,   t hi s concern  decreases t he  closer  t he  governm ent   i s t oo
an electi on.   I n t hi s wa y   t he benefi t   param eter  and t he di scount   r ate appl i ed t o
f ut ure enforcem ent  costs bot h  wo r k  t o  i ncrease t he  l ow est   enforceable i nfl ati on
r ate or  l ow est   t i me   consi stent  r ate.
The  ol d  pol i t i cal  m acroeconom i cs i dent i f i es an i m port ant  excepti on  t o  t he
proceeding analysi s in t he case w here governm ent s rem ain popul ar and
expected to w i n t he el ecti on.  The concept of electoral securi t y w as cent r al to
t he Frey and Schnei der  ( 1978)  pol i t i cal  busi ness cycle m odel .   They  r ecogni sed
t he need t o m odel  simu l t aneously t he t i mi ng of electi ons and a governm ent ’ s
r e-electi on probabi l i t y.  Ther efore, w hen w e m easure electoral securi t y,  it  is
perhaps necessary t o use a w ei ght ed popul ari t y i ndex.  The wei ght  w oul d be
dependent   on  t he  t i me   elapsed i n  an electi on  peri od.
The pol i t i cal busi ness cycle li t erature infers that  electoral securi t y m ay
aff ect  bot h  t he  necessit y  t o  generate surpri se i nfl ati on  and  t he  costs of  so doi ng.
Un l i ke t he earl y N ordhaus pol i t i cal busi ness cycle m odel ,  pol i t i cal
ma n i pul ati on  i n  t he  Ba r r o-Go r don  f r am ew ork  has  f ut ure r eput ati onal   costs.  The
begi nni ng of  a new  electi on cycle does not   necessari l y ma r k a f r esh start   f or  a
governm ent .   Econom i c r eput ati ons  carr y  over  and  do  not   r ecogni se t he  art i f i cial
boundary i m posed by an el ecti on as suggest ed by N ordhaus.  O ne electi on
peri od  i s not   separate f r om   anot her.25
The Bar r o-Go r don fr am ew ork suggest s that  if  the set t i ng t o t he pol i cy
i nst r um ent Π is delegated to a m ore infl ati on-averse agent then t he i nfl ati on
bi as can be reduced. If  one i ma g i nes a suit ably const i t ut ed centr al bank w ho
deri ves no ut i l i t y f r om  generati ng surpri se i nfl ati on,   t hen eff ecti vel y t hei r   l oss
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Wi t h  a zero  benefi t   param eter  t he  di screti onary  i nfl ati on  r ate becom es t he
opt i ma l   i nfl ati on  r ate,  wh i ch i n  t hi s case i s zero.
The sam e considerati ons t hat  appl y t o t he benefi t  param eter coul d al so
appl y t o t he opt i ma l   r ate of  i nfl ati on.   Pol i cy-ma k e r s coul d be seen as mo r e or
l ess i nfl ati on averse dependi ng upon t he opport uni sti c f actors i dent i f i ed above.
A mo r e opport uni sti call y i ncl i ned pol i cy-ma k e r  coul d be seen as inferr i ng a
hi gher  opt i ma l   i nfl ati on r ate,  t hus f urt her  i ncreasing t he di screti onary i nfl ati on
choi ce over and above t hat  i mp l i ed by a larger benefi t  param eter.  Si nce
i nfl ati on bi as i s m easured bet w een t he di screti onary and opt i ma l   i nfl ati on r ates
t he m agni t ude of infl ati on bi as is independent  of the opt i ma l  infl ati on rate.
Ther efore,  shoul d  we   all ow   bot h  t he  benefi t   param eter  and  t he  opt i ma l   i nfl ati on
r ate to vary over an electi on peri od i n accordance w i t h pol i t i cal opport uni sm ,
onl y  t he  benefi t   param eter  wi l l   aff ect  i nfl ati on  bi as.  Ho we v e r ,   bot h  vari ables go
t o  det ermi ne  t he  actual   r ate of  i nfl ati on.
4. 3  The  Par t i san M odel26
Al esina (1987) saw  that  the i m port ance of pol i t i cs could be i ncorporated m ore
expl i cit l y i nt o t he Barr o-Go r don fr am ew ork.  Ra t her than consi deri ng t he i m port ance
of  opport uni sm  he  concentr ated on  t he  i deol ogi cal  aspect  of  pol i cy-ma k i ng.   He   argued
t hat  bot h t he benefi t  param eter and i deal infl ati on rate could refl ect the Left - Ri ght
di me n s i on oft en observed i n pol i t i cs. H e m odel l ed the part y of the Left  as havi ng a
hi gher  opt i ma l   r ate of  i nfl ati on t han i t s r i ght - wi ng count erpart .   He   j ust i f i ed t hi s on t he
grounds t hat  the l eft - wi ng part y i s m ore w il l i ng t o fi nance governm ent  expendi t ures
t hrough  m oney  creati on  and  i s l ess i nfl ati on-averse t han  t he  r i ght - wi ng  part y.
I n t he case of  t he benefi t   param eter,   t he val ue f or  t he l eft - wi ng part y i s denot ed
as, bL,   wh i ch i s greater  t han t hat   of  t he r i ght - wi ng part y,  bR .   I n order  t o simp l i f y t he
analysi s we   wi l l   cont i nue t o assum e t hat   t he opt i ma l   i nfl ati on r ate,  r egardl ess of  part y-
t ype,  is zero.  Thi s does not  aff ect the concl usi ons si nce all  that  is requi r ed is for the
di screti onary i nfl ati on r ates of  t he part i es t o be di f f erent.   Thi s can ari se wi t h di f f erent
benefi t   param eter  val ues alone.   To  t he extent  t hat   t he opt i ma l   r ates of  i nfl ati on f or  t he
t wo   part i es are di f f erent  t hi s wi l l   simp l y  m agni f y  t he  r esult s.
The  econom y i s again m odel l ed accordi ng t o t he Ne w  Cl assical  suppl y f unct i on
i n equat i on ( 4).   The  ma i n di f f erence i s t hat   t here are now  t wo   pol i cy-ma k e r   t ypes so
t hat  equat i on (5) is replaced by two  l oss funct i ons.  Equat i on 5’ refers to a l eft - wi ng
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wh e r e bb LR > .





















2 ΠΠ Π ()
( 6”)
Wi t h t w o pol i cy-ma k e r  t ypes t here exist t wo  d i screti onary i nfl ati on choi ces.
Mi ni mi sing t he expect ed value of t he each poli cy-ma k e r ’ s loss funct i on gi ves t he













Si nce bb LR > ,  the di screti onary i nfl ati on choi ce w il l  alw ays be hi gher for the l eft -
wi ng part y t han for the ri ght - wi ng part y. 6 The di f f erence simp l y refl ects the benefi t
param eters. A lesina (1987) r efers to t hi s dif f erence as a m easure of pol i t i cal
pol ari sati on.   We   can r epresent  t hi s pol ari sati on,   q,   as
6.  If  t he opt i ma l  rates for L and R had been  ΠL
*  and  ΠR
*  respecti vel y,  wh e r e  ΠΠ LR
** > ,  t he






















() bb LR ( 26)
Thi s pol ari sati on i s greater if  there is any di f f erence in t he pol i cy-ma k e r s’ opt i ma l
i nfl ati on  r ates.7
El ecti on result  uncert aint y i s fundam ent al to t he m odel .  Af t er the el ecti on t he
i nfl ati on rate w il l  depend upon t he pol i t i cal part y (pol i cy-ma k e r )  elected. The publ i c
are assum ed to know  t he i nfl ati on preferences of the t w o pol i t i cal part i es. They also
have i nforma t i on fr om  opi ni on pol l s about  the probabi l i t y of each part y w i nni ng t he
electi on.  For  simp l i cit y i t  i s assum ed that  t he probabi l i t y of electi on success is
exogenous.  Par t y L w i ns w i t h probabi l i t y P and Part y R w i t h probabi l i t y (1-P) .
El ecti on r esult   uncert aint y i s a cruci al  concern f or  t hose cont r acts negot i ated pri or  t o
t he  electi on  t hat   t hen  r un  i nt o  t he  new   electi on  peri od.
El ecti on result  uncert aint y al l ow s t he i nfl ati on rate chosen aft er the el ecti on by
t he successful   part y t o di f f er  f r om  expected i nfl ati on.   We   can wr i t e expected i nfl ati on






e PP =+ − () 1 ( 27)
Si nce t he publ i c solve f or  each pol i cy-ma k e r ’ s obj ecti ve f unct i on,   we   can subst i t ut e i n
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Thi s i nfers t hat   aft er  an electi on,   assum ing  som e electi on  r esult   uncert aint y,   t here
wi l l  be an expansi on or cont r acti on i n out put  dependi ng on w hi ch pol i t i cal part y i s
elected. If  the l eft - wi ng part y i s elected, infl ati on w i l l  be hi gher than expect ed since
som e we i ght   i s pl aced on  r i ght - wi ng  success.  The  r esult   wi l l   be  an expansi on  i n  out put .
The  l ess l i kel y  t he  r esult ,   t he  sm all er  i s P  and  t he  greater  i s t he  post - electi on  expansi on
i n out put .   I f   t he r i ght - wi ng part y i s elected,  i nfl ati on wi l l   be l ow er  t han expected and
t he  r esult   wi l l   be  a cont r acti on  i n  out put .   Ag a i n  t he  mo r e unl i kel y  t he  r esult ,   t he  l arger
i sP  and  t he  l arger  i s t he  post - electi on  cont r acti on  i n  out put .
I t   can also be seen t hat   t he l arger  t he di f f erence bet w een t he benefi t   param eters
t he greater the expansi on or cont r acti on.  Gr eater pol i t i cal pol ari sati on st em s fr om  an
i ncreasing di f f erence betw een the di screti onary i nfl ati on choi ces. Gr eater pol i t i cal
I fΠΠ LR
** = ,   t hi s w oul d  coll apse t o  equat i on  ( 26).30
pol ari sati on  i ncreases t he  i m port ance of  electi on  r esult   uncert aint y  on  t he  out put   i n  t he
econom y. 8
O nce all   wa g e   cont r acts are negot i ated on  t he  basi s of  t he  actual   part y  or  pol i cy-
ma k e r   i n pow er,   out put   or  unem pl oym ent   wi l l   r eturn t o t hei r   nat ural  l evels.  Ho we v e r ,
t he  t i me   consi stent  r ates of  i nfl ati on  f or  t he  t wo   part i es wi l l   alwa y s   di f f er  so l ong  as t he
benefi t   param eters di f f er.   Ther efore,  wh i l e i nfl ati on w oul d cont i nue t o be hi gher  under
t he l eft - wi ng part y f or  t he r em ainder  of  t he electi on peri od,   out put   and unem pl oym ent
w oul d  be  at  t he  nat ural  l evels,  r egardl ess of  part y.
I n order  t o ma k e   t he com put ati on of  t he vari ance of  i nfl ati on and out put   easier
we   wi l l   f ol l ow  Al esina and Ga t t i   ( 1995)  and ma k e   a f ew  simp l e assum pti ons wh i ch do
not  aff ect the general concl usi ons of the m odel .  We  s h a l l  assum e that  an electi on
peri od coinci des wi t h t he l engt h of  a wa g e   cont r act  and wi t h t he t erm  i n off i ce.  Thus,
expectati ons are forme d ,  electi ons t ake place and the part y of governm ent  chooses
i nfl ati on.   Thi s pat t ern  i s r epeated i n  every  peri od.   I n  t hi s case,  t he  post - electi on  t erm  i s
one  peri od  onl y.   Ther efore,  out put   cont i nual l y  r efl ects t he  i m port ance of  electi on  r esult
uncert aint y and i s at it s natural level onl y w hen t hi s uncert aint y i s rem oved or the
degree of  pol i t i cal  pol ari sati on i s zero.   The  vari ance of  i nfl ati on and out put   w oul d be
scaled dow n proport i onat ely i f   addi t i onal   post - electi on peri ods we r e i ncl uded since i n
8.   Wi t h  opt i ma l   i nfl ati on  r ates, ΠL
*   and ΠR
* ,   post - electi on  out put   f or  L  and  R  r especti vel y  i s
YP b b
YP b b
LL R L R
RL R L R
post
post
=− − + −
=− − + −
() [ ( ) ( ) ]










t hese addi t i onal  peri ods out put  w oul d be at  it s natural level and expect ed infl ati on
w oul d  be  equal   t o  actual   i nfl ati on.
Gi ven  our  assum pti ons,   expected out put   w oul d  be
YP Y P Y t
e
LR tt =+ − () ( ) () 1 ( 31)
Subst i t ut i ng  f r om   ( 28)  and  ( 29)  we   f i nd
Yt
e = = 0 ( 32)
We   can f i nd  t he  vari ance of  out put





The  vari ance of  out put   t hus  r efl ects t he  degree of  pol i t i cal  pol ari sati on. 9  I f   t he  pol i t i cal
part i es we r e i dent i cal  t hen  t he  r esult   coll apses t o  t hat   i n  t he  Ba r r o-Go r don  m odel ,   such
t hat   t he vari ance of  out put   i s zero.   I f   t hi s wa s   t he case t hen electi on r esult   uncert aint y
w oul d be i r r elevant and out put  w oul d be at  it s natural level.  Wh e r e the part i es are
di f f erent,   t he  degree of  di f f erence and  t he  uncert aint y  of  t he  r esult   are i m port ant.   I f   t he
electi on result  wa s  a  f oregone concl usi on t hen i t  w oul d not  ma t t er that  the pol i t i cal
part i es we r e di f f erent  since f ul l y i nforme d ,   r ati onal   agents w oul d be able t o solve t he
opt i mi sati on  probl em  and  expected i nfl ati on  w oul d  equal   actual   i nfl ati on.
9.   Wi t h  opt i ma l   i nfl ati on  r ates, ΠL
*   and ΠR
* ,




Gi ven  equat i on  ( 27)  we   can show   t hat   t he  vari ance of  i nfl ati on  i s equal   t o





and t hus i s equal  t o t he vari ance of out put .  Ag a i n pol i t i cal pol ari sati on and t he
uncert aint y  of  t he  electi on  r esult   can be  seen t o  aff ect  t he  vari ance of  i nfl ati on. 10
Al esina’s m odel  t hus dem onst r ates how  i deol ogy can aff ect i nfl ati on pol i cy.
Fur t hermo r e, it  all ow s one t o m odel  a part i san pol i t i cal busi ness cycle w it hi n a new
classical  f r am ew ork.
4. 4  The  Rogoff   M odel
On e   ma j or  draw back of  t he f r am ew ork used by bot h Ba r r o and Go r don ( 1983)
and A lesina ( 1987)  i s t hat   i t   does not   all ow  f or  shocks t o hi t   t he econom y.   Wi t h one
pol i cy-ma k e r   t ype t he vari ance of  out put   and i nfl ati on i n bot h m odel s w oul d be zero.
By  i ncl udi ng a r andom  shock t erm,   Rogoff   ( 1985)  i s able t o show  t hat   wh i l e handi ng
m onet ary pol i cy t o an i ndependent   centr al  bank r educes i nfl ati on bi as t hi s coul d be at
t he expense of increased output  vol ati l i t y.  Rogoff  dem onst r ates how  a pol i cy-ma k e r
coul d choose an i ndependent  agent wi t h a l ow er benefi t  param eter and yet  increase
t hei r   ow n we l f are.  Wh i l e t hi s w oul d r esult   i n a l ow er  average i nfl ati on r ate and l ow er
i nfl ati on  vari ance,  t he  econom y’s out put   vari ance w oul d  be  greater  despi t e t he  average
l evel  of  out put   r em aini ng  at  i t s nat ural  l evel.
10.   Wi t h  opt i ma l   i nfl ati on  r ates, ΠL
*   and ΠR
* ,




To show  Rogoff ’ s m ain result s w e present the si mp l i f i cati on off ered in A l esina
and G att i  ( 1995).  The econom y i s m odel l ed as in equat i on (4) except t hat  an
i ndependent l y and i dent i call y di str i but ed shock t erm,  et,  is int r oduced.  Thi s has a
zero  m ean and  vari ance,  s e
2 .   Ther efore,  we   can m odel   t he  econom y  as:
Yttt
e
t =−+ ΠΠe ( 35)
The  pol i cy-ma k e r ’ s l oss f unct i on  i s m odi f i ed f r om   ( 5)  t o  all ow   f or  t he  shock  t erm  t o  be
signi f i cant  and  can t hus  be  wr i t t en as:
Z
b
kY tt t = =+ +− −
1
22
22 Π () ( 36)
Subst i t ut i ng  i n  f r om   equat i on  ( 35)  t hi s becom es:
Z
b
k tt t t
e
t = =+ +− −+ +− −
1
22
22 ΠΠ Π () e ( 37)
Ag a i n econom i c agents are assum ed to form  expectati ons fi r st,  thi s is fol l ow ed
by t he shock,  before the pol i cy-ma k e r  chooses t he pol i cy inst r um ent ,   Π .  The
di screti onary i nfl ati on choi ce of t he pol i cy-ma k e r  i nvol ves t aking t he fi r st order
condi t i on  of  ( 37)    and  solvi ng  f or  Πt
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wh i l e t he  expected i nfl ati on  r ate i s
11.   Wi t h  t he  nat ural  l evel  of  out put ,  Y*  and  opt i ma l   i nfl ati on  r ate Π*,   t he di screti onary i nfl ati on r ate
w oul d  be34
Πt
e bk = ( 39)
The  pol i cy choi ce again i nvol ves an i nfl ati on bi as,  bk,   since t he opt i ma l   or  i deal




e ) .   The  i nfl ati on
choi ce w il l  be greater the l arger the benefi t  param eter as w as found by Barr o and
Go r don.   Ther efore,  one  coul d  use  t he  ol d  pol i t i cal  m acroeconom i cs i n  t he  sam e wa y   as
w as appl i ed to t he Barr o and G ordon fr am ew ork.  Ho we v e r ,  w e can now  m akes
i nferences relati ng t o t he vari ance of i nfl ati on and out put  as w ell  as the l evels of
i nfl ati on  and  i nfl ati on  bi as.
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we   can see r eadil y  t hat   a hi gher  benefi t   param eter  not   onl y  l eads t o  hi gher  i nfl ati on  but
mo r e vari able i nfl ati on.








By subst i t ut i ng for Πt and  Πt
e int o (35),  we  f i nd t hat  out put 12 and expect ed










e = 0 ( 44)
Ther efore, average output  is it s natural level.  The benefi t  param eter does not  aff ect










2 s e ( 45)
a hi gher  benefi t   param eter  actual l y  r educes t he  vari ance of  out put .
A  s u mma r y  of  t hese  r esult s f r om   t he  Rogoff   m odel   i s show n  i n  Tabl e 1.
Tabl e 1:  S u mma r y   of  R ogoff ’ s Re s ul t s
































() + + b
s e
A k ey quest i on posed by Rogoff  wa s  wh e t her a pol i cy-ma k e r  can gain by
handi ng-over infl ati on pol i cy to an i ndependent  centr al bank w i t h a di f f erent benefi t
param eter  i n t he l oss f unct i on.   I t   i s assum ed t hat   t he agent  w oul d be chosen f i r st  and
t hen t he t i mi ng of  events w oul d be as before.  Ou r   concern i s t he val ue of  t he benefi t
param eter  t hat   w oul d mi ni mi se t he expected l oss of  t he pol i cy-ma k e r .   We   shall   denot e
t hi s part i cular  benefi t   param eter  as b
∧ ∧
.   Gi ven t hat   t he i ndependent   centr al  bank w oul d
f ace the sam e opt i mi sati on probl em  as previousl y sol ved for the pol i cy-ma k e r ,  the
above  solut i ons  f or  out put   and  i nfl ati on  wi l l   f eed i nt o  t he  pol i cy-ma k e r ’ s l oss f unct i on,37
but   wi t h b
∧ ∧
  r ather  t han b .   The  pol i cy-ma k e r   wi l l   t hen  mi ni mi se t hei r   l oss f unct i on.   We
can wr i t e t he  opt i ma l   choi ce f or  t he  pol i cy-ma k e r   as































Si nce bot h b  and  b
∧ ∧
are assum ed to be posi t i ve,  the pol i cy-ma k e r  can actual l y gai n
we l f are fr om  del egati ng i nfl ati on pol i cy to an i ndependent  centr al bank w i t h a l ow er
benefi t  param eter.  Consequent l y,  the bank w oul d be m ore infl ati on-averse than t he
pol i cy-ma k e r .
An  i m port ant imp l i cati on of Rogoff ’ s result  is that  since  bb
∧ ∧
< < ,  bot h expected
i nfl ati on  and  i nfl ati on  vari ance wi l l   be  l ow er  under  del egati on.   Ho we v e r ,   wh i l e average
out put   wi l l   r em ain at  i t s nat ural  l evel  t he vari ance of  out put   wi l l   be hi gher.   These can
be  seen by  i nspect i on  of  Tabl e 1.
4. 5  Ga i n  wi t hout   pai n?
Al esina and G at t i  ( 1995) chall enge Rogoff ’ s theoreti cal f i ndi ng t hat  an
i ndependent   centr al  bank  necessari l y  m eans an i ncrease i n  out put   vari abil i t y  i n  r educi ng
i nfl ati on and i nfl ati on vari abil i t y.  They poi nt  t o em pi r i cal wo r k by A l esina and
S u mme r s (1993) wh i ch, for a selecti on of O ECD  count r i es, fi nds no relati onshi p38
bet w een the dependence of the centr al bank and out put  vari abil i t y.  Thi s can be seen
f r om  t he di agram  below  w hi ch is const r uct ed fr om  t he dat a used by A l esina and
S u mme r s.
CENTRAL  BANK  I NDEPENDENCE  AND  VARI ANCE
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The t heoreti cal underpi nni ng as t o w hy cent r al bank i ndependence does not
i ncrease out put   vari abil i t y centr es on t he sources of  t hi s vari abil i t y.   The  Rogoff   m odel
concentr ates onl y on econom i call y i nduced vari abil i t y fr om  exogenous shocks,  wh i ch
m onet ary  pol i cy coul d  t hen  att em pt  t o  stabil i se f or.   Ho we v e r ,   Al esina  and  Ga t t i   ( 1995)
also perceive t here to be a pol i t i call y i nduced vari abil i t y.  I n fact,  t hi s is a very
part i cular  source of  vari abil i t y based on A l esina’s earl i er m odel  (see A lesina (1987)) .
The var i abil i t y i s thus t he uncert aint y about  t he fut ure course of m onet ary pol i cy39
ari sing f r om  pol i t i cal  com peti t i on bet w een t wo   part i san pol i cy-ma k e r s.  El ecti on r esult
uncert aint y  t hen  i nduces  a part i san busi ness cycle.
Al esina and G at t i  m odi f y A l esina’s m odel  by addi ng an i ndependent l y and
i dent i call y di str i but ed shock t erm,  et ,  t o t he m odel  t he econom y.  Ther efore, t he
econom y i s m odel l ed as in equat i on (35).  Ther e are again t w o pol i cy-ma k e r ’ s or
pol i t i cal  part i es.  The  r especti ve l oss f unct i ons f or  t he l eft - wi ng ( L)   and r i ght - wi ng ( R)
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wh e r e bb LR >> 0.
I nfl ati onary  expectati ons  are f orme d   before t he  electi on  and  wa g e s   set.   Af t er  t he
electi on,  the shock  e  occurs and t he pol i cy-ma k e r  chooses t he i nfl ati on rate. It  is
assum ed,  as i n  t he  earl i er  Al esina  m odel ,   t hat   Par t y  L  wi ns  wi t h  probabi l i t y  P  and  Par t y
R wi t h probabi l i t y (1-P) .  The pr obabi l i t y of electi on success is exogenousl y gi ven.







tt =+ − () 1 ( 50)
To s i mp l i f y m at t ers it  wi l l  be assum ed t hat  the el ecti on peri od i s equi val ent to t he
l engt h  of  wa g e   cont r acts.40



























() e ( 52)
Taki ng  expectati ons  of  ( 51)  and  ( 52)  and  subst i t ut i ng  i nt o  equat i on  ( 50),   we   f i nd
Πt
e LR R L
LL R









Subst i t ut i ng  equat i on  ( 53)  i nt o  equat i ons  ( 51)  and  ( 52)  gi ves  us  t he  r especti ve  i nfl ati on
























































































Ther efore,  t he  expected val ue  of  out put   i s






tt =+ − = () 10 ( 58)
The subst anti ve t heoreti cal devel opm ent  f ol l ow s fr om  t he equat i ons for t he
vari ance of  i nfl ati on and out put .   These wi l l   be seen t o com pri se an econom i call y and
pol i t i call y  i nduced  com ponent .   The  vari ance of  out put   i s f ound  t o  be
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The f i r st t erm r efl ects pol i t i call y i nduced vari ance because of electi on result
uncert aint y.  If ,  P =1 or P = 0 electi on result  uncert aint y i s rem oved.  If  bb LR =   so
t hat   t he t wo   pol i cy-ma k e r s coll apse t o a singl e t ype t hen electi on r esult   uncert aint y i s
again r em oved.   I n bot h cases t he onl y vari ance ari ses f r om  t he exogenous shock t erm,
et.   Thi s l att er  t erm  i ncreases i n  signi f i cance t he  l ess bot h  part i es wi sh t o  stabil i se.
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Ag a i n  t he  f i r st  t erm  r efl ects pol i t i call y  i nduced  vari ance,  wh i l e t he  second  t erm  r efl ects
t he  exogenous  shock.42
Al esina and G at t i  concl ude t hat  an independent  infl ati on-averse centr al banker
does not   necessari l y l ead t o greater  out put   vari abil i t y.   Thi s i s because t he vari ance of
bot h  out put   and  i nfl ati on  com pri se a pol i t i cal  and  econom i c elem ent.     Ther efore,  i n  t he
curr ent  cont ext  consi der  t he  out com e of  bot h  pol i cy-ma k e r s appoi nt i ng  an i ndependent
centr al banker wi t h som e benefi t  param eter,  b
∧
.  A ssum e that  b
∧
 is chosen before
expectati ons  are f orme d   and  t hat   electi ons  t hen  f ol l ow .   Af t er  t he  electi on e   i s r eali sed
and  f i nal l y  t he  centr al  banker  chooses  t he  r ate of  i nfl ati on.
The  out com es f r om   appoi nt i ng  an i ndependent   centr al  banker  are t hen  equi val ent
t o t hose fr om  t he Rogoff  m odel .  The di f f erence is then i n t he com pari son w i t h t he
scenari o of a pol i t i cised centr al banker.  Ou r  benchm ark i s now  t hose out com es fr om
t he A l esina  and  Ga t t i   part i san m odel .   The  out com es f r om   a dependent   and  i ndependent
centr al  banker  are s u mma r i sed i n  Tabl e 2  bel ow .
Tabl e 2:  Econom i c Ou t com es and  Ce nt ral  B ankers
Dependent Independent
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Tabl e 2 show s t hat  an ‘appropri ate’ choi ce of  b
∧
 can deli ver bot h a l ow er
expected  infl ati on and a l over vari ance of infl ati on.  Ho we v e r ,  the si gni f i cant result
hi ghl i ght ed by  Al esina  and  Ga t t i   i n  Tabl e 2  i s t hat   an i ndependent   centr al  bank  does  not
necessari l y i nfer  greater  out put   vari abil i t y as concl uded by Rogoff   ( 1985).   Al esina and
Ga t t i  argue t hat  “the vari ance of out put  can easil y be l arger t han t he vari ance of
out put  wi t h an i ndependent  centr al bank” (1995,  p.  199). 13 If  the t wo  p a r t i es w ere
i dent i cal,  then t he di f f erence betw een the dependent  and independent  centr al banker
scenari os w oul d depend upon t he degree,  i f   any,   t o wh i ch bb b LR
∧
<=.  Wi t h i dent i cal
part i es, t he pol i t i cs disappears and w e are left  simp l y w i t h t he not i on t hat  t he
i ndependent  centr al banker is m ore infl ati on-averse. Ne v e r t hel ess, as the di f f erence
bet w een t he benefi t   param eters of  t he t wo   pol i cy-ma k e r s i ncreases,  t he i m port ance of
t he pol i t i cal vari ance also increases. For  a suff i cientl y l arge di f f erence betw een the
benefi t  param eters, the pol i t i cal term  dom i nat es. In t hi s case, the vari ance of out put
wi t h  an i ndependent   centr al  bank  w oul d  be  ‘ signi f i cantl y  l ow er’ .
5.   Co nc l usi ons
The  paper  surveys  t he  new   pol i t i cal  m acroeconom i cs wh i ch has  devel oped  out   of
t he new  cl assical m acroeconom i c revol ut i on of t he 1970s.  It  has m ade i m port ant
cont r i but i ons t o t he debat e about   t he del egati on of  m onet ary pol i cy and t he degree of
pol i t i cal and econom i c independence of centr al banks.  Ho we v e r ,  w e began by
i nt r oduci ng t he ol d pol i t i cal  m acroeconom i cs and t he area of  pol i t i cal  busi ness cycles.
The  ‘ ol d’  school   suggest   t hat   governm ent s are able t o create opport uni sti c or  part i san
13.   I t ali c em phasi s i s t hat   of  t he  authors.44
busi ness cycles and perhaps even bot h.  By i nt r oduci ng t he pol i t i cal busi ness cycle
school  w e show  how  i t  is possibl e to bet t er tr ansfer som e of the characteri sati ons of
governm ent s’  obj ecti ve  f unct i ons  over  t o  t he  new   pol i t i cal  m acroeconom i cs.
The new  pol i t i cal m acroeconom i c m odel  of K ydl and and Prescott  (1977) i s
opport uni sti c in nat ure. Ho we v e r ,  unl i ke t he N ordhaus m odel  (1975) fr om  t he ‘ol d’
school ,   no busi ness cycle em erges.   I nst ead,  opport uni sm  i n t he K ydl and and Prescott
m odel  r esult s in excessive i nfl ati on or i nfl ati on bi as. Ther efore, alt hough t he
governm ent  inheri t s the m edi an vot er’ s preferences, wh e n  t he econom i c constr aint  is
i m posed t hi s vot er,  li ke ot hers, acts in such a w ay that  the governm ent  is unabl e to
t r ade-off   i nfl ati on  f or  mo r e out put .   The  r esult   i s hi gher  i nfl ati on  f or  no  extr a out put .
The Bar r o and G ordon (1983) m odel  consi ders w hether t he i m port ance of
r eput ati on t o governm ent s reduces the i nherent am ount  of excessive i nfl ati on.  It s
f ormu l ati on al l ow s one t o draw  on i deas fr om  t he pol i t i cal busi ness cycle li t erature.
I ndeed,A lesina ( 1987)  has used Hi bbsi an obj ecti ve f unct i ons f r om  wh i ch i t   i s easy t o
show  t hat  t he degree of i nfl ati on bi as is part y-dependent .  Thi s result s fr om  t he
characteri sati on of l eft - of- centr e governm ent s as placing relati ve m ore w eight  on
out put   t han  i nfl ati on    t han  r i ght - of- centr e governm ent s.
On e   can t ake t he  i dea of  t he  i nfl ati on  cost  of  extr a out put   and  argue  t hat   t hat   t he
t ol erance to t hi s cost i s dependent  upon a governm ent ’ s electoral securi t y.
G overnm ent s m ay be m ore tol erant to t he i nfl ati on cost  wh e n  t hey are unpopul ar or
close t o an electi on.  In t hi s w ay one can use t he concept  of opport uni sm  m ore
expl i cit l y wh e n   analysi ng t he eff ect  on i nfl ati on bi as.  An   electorall y secure governm ent
m ay be l ess tol erant of the i nfl ati on cost  and l ess w il l i ng t o di scount  fut ure costs45
r esult i ng f r om  t he l ost   credibi l i t y of  generati ng surpri se i nfl ati on t oday.   Ther efore,  by
draw ing  on  t he  wa y   t hat   opport uni sm  i s port r ayed i n  t he  ol d  pol i t i cal  m acroeconom i cs
one  can f urt her  expl ore t he  det ermi nant s of  i nfl ati on  bi as.
The paper concl udes by surveyi ng t he new  pol i t i cal m acroeconom i cs for an
answ er  as t o  wh e t her  t he  establi shing  of  an i ndependent   centr al  bank  off ers all   gai n  and
no pai n.   Rogoff   ( 1985)  suggest s t hat   t here exists a credibi l i t y-out put   vari abil i t y t r ade-
off .   By  del egati ng m onet ary pol i cy t o a mo r e i nfl ati on-averse body one has t o accept
hi gher out put  vari abil i t y for any reduct i on i n i nfl ati on bi as. Mo t i vat ed by em pi r i cal
evidence  t hat   off ers l i t t l e support   f or  t he  credibi l i t y-out put   vari abil i t y  t r ade-off ,   Al esina
and G att i   show  t hat   an i ndependent   centr al  bank ma y   or  ma y   not   i ncrease a count r y’s
out put  vari abil i t y.  The answ er appears to depend upon t he degree of pol i t i call y
i nduced vari abil i t y relati ve t o econom i c induced vari ance. I f  t he forme r  i s m ore
i m port ant  t hen  an i ndependent   centr al  bank  wi l l   r educe out put   vari abil i t y.46
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